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The Hiddenness of God, an expanded version of Michael Rea’s 2017 Gifford 
Lectures, is an intellectually rigorous and pastorally perceptive book. The 
methodology that Rea employs makes it an exemplary work of confes-
sional philosophy of religion. First, his approach is interdisciplinary. He 
engages thoughtfully not only with contemporary and classical philoso-
phy, but also with the work of theologians and biblical scholars without 
sacrificing any philosophical rigor or speaking condescendingly of work 
in other disciplines. Second, rather than setting aside “existential” ques-
tions to treat divine hiddenness primarily as a logical problem of recon-
ciling faith in a loving God with the reality of human experience, Rea 
offers an insightful philosophical and theological defense of a practical 
and pastoral vision of the love of God for those whose ability to trust God 
has been deeply marred by God’s apparent absence. Given that philoso-
phers and other intellectually savvy people are among those who feel the 
weight of divine hiddenness and who seek answers that satisfy both the 
intellectual challenge and their emotional and spiritual struggle, Rea does 
a great service to the community of faith. Indeed, even at points where 
the argument does not fully persuade (which I shall identify below), one 
gets the sense that Rea has put his finger on the important issues. This is a 
book that I would recommend to my fellow philosophers and to an intel-
lectually curious friend in the throes of anguish over their sense of God’s 
absence, and there is not much higher praise that I could offer a work on 
this topic.
As Rea sees it, the problem of divine hiddenness, in all of its various 
forms, results from violated expectations (25). We suppose we know 
something about how a loving God would behave towards God’s creation, 
and these expectations often go unfulfilled in experience. Our varying as-
sumptions about a loving God’s accessibility to us give rise to number of 
distinct forms of the problem of divine hiddenness. Rea focuses the pres-
ent work on two: one doxastic and one experiential. The doxastic problem 
includes the inconclusive evidence about God’s existence and the (related) 
presence of reasonable and non-resistant non-belief in God (the existence 
of which Rea does not himself acknowledge but includes for the sake of 
argument). The experiential problem is the fact that many who long for a 
sense of God’s loving presence never have this desire fulfilled, and some 
who seek God are so traumatized by their experience that they may lose 
the capacity to relate to God in ways that we usually think of as positive.
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In light of such realities, we may conclude that there is no God, that 
God is not loving to all humans, or that our initial expectations about the 
behavior of a loving God were misguided. Although Rea himself does not 
put it in precisely this way, I take his solution to be a combination of the 
latter two. God is not loving, if the term “loving” here refers univocally 
to our human concept of love, and our expectations about how a divine 
being would demonstrate love towards finite beings like us are inappro-
priate. In chapter 3, Rea argues that, despite being largely neglected by 
analytic philosophers of religion, divine transcendence is among the attri-
butes that both perfect being theology and the Christian tradition ascribe 
to God, and that this attribute should be taken seriously in our reasoning 
about the problem of divine hiddenness. In chapter 4, Rea argues for a 
“mid-range” characterization of transcendence. On one hand, he argues 
that pan-symbolism (the thesis that “(i) all true theological discourse is 
metaphorical, and (ii) no theological claim is literally true” [43]) is false. 
On the other hand, neither is it true that “many of God’s intrinsic attributes 
can, even apart from divine revelation, be deeply understood and charac-
terized in literal, univocal terms and be made the literal semantic content 
of human words and concepts” (49). The appropriate understanding lies 
somewhere in between. Rea characterizes mid-range transcendence in the 
following way:
(DT) Divine transcendence is whatever intrinsic attribute of God ex-
plains the fact that intrinsic substantive predications of God or of the 
divine nature that express non-revealed concepts are, at best, ana-
logical (51).
If DT is true, then, apart from revelation, we have reason to believe that 
God is loving, at best, only in an analogical sense. But the descriptions of 
the love that proponents of the problem of divine hiddenness, like J. L. 
Schellenberg, offer assume that God’s love is just like, or at least very simi-
lar to, ideal human love. Thus, the expectations of God’s availability to 
us, which are necessary for the success of the argument from hiddenness, 
are inappropriate. As Rea puts it, “[I]n light of the fact that divine love is 
importantly different from human love . . . arguments like Schellenberg’s 
require for their rational believability a certain kind of defense of their 
theological premises that Schellenberg has not yet produced” (57).
In chapter 5, Rea temporarily sets aside DT to argue that even if God is 
at most “lightly transcendent” (63), we should not conceive of divine love 
as an idealization of (the best forms of) human love as it is often assumed 
to be. According to Rea, to have an attribute in an ideal way involves pos-
sessing it in a way such that all limitations on that attribute are removed. 
That is, “[a] person who loves an individual or group of individuals in an 
ideal way would be unlimited in her desire for union with her beloved, 
unlimited in her desire for the good of her beloved, or both” (69). This is, 
quite obviously, not the way that God does or should love human beings. 
We have no reason to think that humans are the right sorts of beings to 
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tolerate unlimited union with God (the witness of scripture tells us that 
no one can see God and live). Furthermore, the God of the Christian tradi-
tion is a person. This means that God may well have personal interests and 
desires that have nothing to do with humans and their good. We have no 
reason to think that God’s own personal interests might not sometimes 
come into conflict with the good of some or all humans. Further, it is pos-
sible that God sometimes sacrifices the good of humans for those other in-
terests, just as our own partners, parents, and friends sometimes prioritize 
their own interests above ours. Both points suggest that the expectations 
about God’s love that give rise to the problem of divine hiddenness are 
inappropriate. Rea’s solution to the problem of divine hiddenness in chap-
ters 3 and 4 bears a strong resemblance to the skeptical theist response to 
the problem of evil—our inability to think of a good reason for a loving 
God to be (apparently) absent to some people doesn’t give us any reason 
to doubt that God in fact has one.
Rea devotes the final four chapters of the book to demonstrating that, 
despite our violated expectations, and despite the fact that transcendent 
divine love might not be as much like human love as we assume, it is still 
apt to describe God as loving towards all humans. In chapters 6 and 7, he 
develops a theory of religious experience according to which it results, not 
from direct causal contact with a supernatural stimulus (i.e., God or other 
supernatural reality), but from “cognitively impacted” experience of the 
natural world (where “cognitively impacted” means that our cognition 
either “affects the character or content of the experience itself” or “our 
spontaneous response to the experience” [105]). The upshot of the theory 
is that low-level religious experiences are much more widely accessible 
than often assumed and are not the result of either God’s whim or God’s 
response to human efforts.
The final two chapters attempt to sketch how we might understand a 
hidden God as showing love to those with deeply conflicted relationships 
with God—relationships marred by unfulfilled expectations, experiences 
of religious trauma, or the complete lack of the concept of God. According 
to Rea, God shows love to the first two categories of people by authorizing 
lament and protest against God and to the latter because “simply trying 
to participate in a relationship with God by itself suffices for participa-
tion in a relationship with God” (162). That is, literally everyone, from the 
saint who enjoys mystical experiences of the divine, to those who suffer 
from the effects of religious trauma, to those who lack a concept of God, 
can participate in a positively meaningful relationship with God just by 
trying. Furthermore, Rea follows Marilyn McCord Adams in arguing that 
the crucifixion provides a means by which horrendous sufferings such as 
those associated with religious trauma can ultimately be defeated.
There is much to appreciate in this book, but insofar as I have anti-
theodic leanings (and a related tendency to reject attempts to offer a solu-
tion to the problem of divine hiddenness), I’m tempted to gesture broadly 
at the entire project, objecting to its very existence. Instead, I will proceed 
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more constructively by raising a worry about the project of chapter 5 and 
then reflecting on its implications for the rest of the book.
While I think the discussion of divine personhood in chapter 5 contrib-
utes positively to the overall conversation, I’m skeptical about its success 
as an argument that even those who reject DT in favor of “light transcen-
dence” lack justification for the expectations on divine love that motivate 
the hiddenness problem. Insofar as Rea’s characterization of ideal love (as 
I described it above) is what intellectuals and lay people mean when they 
talk about God’s supreme or ideal love for humanity, I think he is cor-
rect. God clearly does not and should not have an unlimited desire for our 
good or desire unlimited union with us. But I suspect that what many actu-
ally mean (or at least what they should mean) when they talk about God’s 
“ideal” love is something more akin to the Aristotelian notion of virtue. 
On this way of construing the common view, if God loves humans per-
fectly or ideally, then God desires union with us and desires our good in 
the appropriate way, to the appropriate degree, and in the appropriate sense. 
“Ideal,” then, is used (perhaps misguidedly) to indicate that God’s love 
is not marred by the sins and vices that distort fallen human love. If we 
accept DT, then I think we have to follow Rea in acknowledging that we 
have little-to-no understanding (apart from revelation) of what it looks 
like for a transcendent divine being to love humans in an appropriate 
way, to an appropriate degree, in an appropriate sense. If DT is true, the 
problem of divine hiddenness does not defeat belief in God’s existence 
or in God’s love (where “love” is used analogically). However, Rea states 
that this chapter operates on the assumption that God is at most “lightly 
transcendent.” That is, discourse about God’s nature and God’s intrinsic 
properties can be literally and univocally true. On this assumption, while 
divine love might not be exactly the same as human love, the concept 
“loving” can be univocally applied to God and the truth conditions for 
the proposition “God loves all humans” should be roughly continuous 
with the truth conditions for propositions about human love. It seems to 
me exceedingly reasonable, if not rationally required, to think that God’s 
pursuing God’s own personal interests at the expense of meeting the most 
basic spiritual needs of the human beings God has created would be very 
strong evidence that the propositions “God loves all human beings” is not 
literally true.
One might respond in the following way: although it sometimes hurts 
our feelings when our partners, parents, or friends prioritize their own 
interests over our own (as Rea himself points out), in moments of cool 
reflection most of us acknowledge that it is appropriate, even good, for 
them to do so. Could we think something similar is true with respect to 
God? Obviously we could. The question is to what degree a lover can ne-
glect the interests of the beloved in favor of other interests and still count 
as a lover in a literal, univocal sense. Consider the following example. If, 
upon reflection, a potential parent recognizes that the pursuit of their own 
goods or some other greater goods would render it impossible for them to 
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meet the most basic and important relational and emotional needs of a po-
tential child (and that there is no one else who might satisfy those needs in 
the parent’s absence), then it seems that the only way to avoid the charge 
of being an unloving parent is for the potential parent to either sacrifice 
(some of) their own interests or other goods for the sake of the child or to 
refrain from bearing a child to begin with. Indeed, it is not uncommon for 
children whose parents have neglected their most basic emotional needs 
and physical well-being in order to pursue some other great good (e.g., 
serving and living among the homeless in an impoverished area, seeking 
peace in a war zone, etc.) to criticize these parents for their failure with 
respect to parental love. Their criticism, of course, is not that their parent’s 
love should have been unlimited, or even that the parent shouldn’t have 
sacrificed some of child’s good to pursue other goods. The criticism is that 
the parent failed to meet some minimum threshold of loving concern for 
the wellbeing of their child. Allowing the child to express their anger, to 
love their parent as far as they understand them, or even defeating the suf-
fering of childhood by somehow incorporating that suffering into a posi-
tively meaningful relationship with them in adulthood does not change 
this fundamental failure as a parent. Similarly, if God is not transcendent 
in a sufficiently strong sense, and if we lack reason to think that human 
goods are somehow served by divine hiddenness (as Rea suggests they 
need not be), then I think it stretches the human concept of love beyond 
recognition to ascribe it to a God who knowingly brings humans into ex-
istence whose most basic spiritual goods, needs, and desires God intends 
to sacrifice for some other, possibly greater, goods. The problem is not the 
existence of limits on divine love, but a failure to meet some minimum 
requirement. “God is loving towards victims of religious trauma” appears 
to be literally false, regardless of what protest God authorizes and even if 
God ultimately defeats the suffering inflicted by God’s apparent absence 
to them.
Obviously, Rea himself does endorse DT, DT is in fact central to the argu-
ment of the book, and the rest of the book is devoted to defusing the force 
of just such negatively-valenced analogies as I offer here. They do so sen-
sitively and poignantly. Whether the work of those chapters is sufficient 
to assuage the worries I raise here will depend on the degree to which the 
reader is willing to stretch the human conception of love in analogous and 
metaphorical usage. It is open for a reader to acknowledge that if DT is 
true, then divine hiddenness does not defeat belief in God’s existence or 
belief in God’s transcendent goodness, but to nonetheless maintain that to 
say that such a God is loving, even analogically or metaphorically, danger-
ously distorts our important human conception of love (especially since 
religious individuals are so prone to take God’s love as an example on 
which to model their own love). Perhaps it is better to say that God is shlov-
ing toward us, where shloving refers to whatever transcendent attribute is 
analogous to human love. Perhaps, as Rea shows through the last four 
chapters, God’s shlove is not nothing. Perhaps it is more than finite, fallen 
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humans deserve. Perhaps we can raise no legitimate complaints against 
God for not loving us. Still, shlove isn’t what many hoped for (especially 
those who have been deeply harmed as a result of seeking God), and to 
our human eyes it may pale in the light of the love we sometimes receive 
from the finite, fallen humans.
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The Christian Idea of God is the third installment of Keith Ward’s systematic 
Christian philosophical theology. However, the book is self-contained and 
meant to stand alone as an exposition and defense of “personal idealism,” 
for the purpose of providing a solid philosophical foundation for Chris-
tian belief. In Ward’s usage, “idealism” refers to the perspective that “mat-
ter cannot exist without mind and depends upon mind for its existence” 
(1). And while Ward never unpacks this dependency relation in detail, it is 
clear that the form of idealism that Ward defends allows for the existence 
of material objects, so long as they are sustained by mind in some way, 
in contrast to a thoroughgoing immaterialism of the kind that is often at-
tributed to Bishop Berkeley. Roughly stated, personal idealism is the view 
that there is one personal supreme mind—one that knows, thinks, feels, 
and intends—on which everything else in the world depends. By design, 
the offered cumulative case for philosophical idealism does not rise to the 
level of argumentative rigor typified by journals of analytic philosophy. 
Instead, the aim is to present a broad framework with wide explanatory 
scope and practical import. The result is a highly readable exploration 
of the contours of a comprehensive worldview, which provides a natural 
home for the Christian faith.
The book contains three parts. In the first part of the book, Ward 
contends that conscious experience is the best starting point for human 
knowledge. And when a human scrutinizes her conscious experience, she 
discovers that sense perceptions, thoughts, and feelings are different in 
kind than that which is spatially located and publicly observable, and that 
these mental states are immaterial and possessed by a unitary subject who 
persists across time and performs intentional actions. Here it seems that 
Ward affirms some form of substance dualism regarding humans, where 
the mental and physical are distinct yet tightly integrated, but Ward is not 
as forthcoming with the details as one would like and expect.
